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REVIEWS.

Inductive Sociology: A Syllabus of Methods, Analyses and Classifications, and Provisionally Formulated Laws. By FRANKLIN HENRY GIDDINGS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901. Pp. xviii + 302.

THIS volume is addressed less to the public than to the students who are ambitious to widen the borders of sociology. The thorough classification and the concise statement of highly generalized truths lend it the formal character of a text in physics and make it hard reading. The purpose of the book is found in the one hundred and twenty-seven schedules of inquiry which are to direct the social observer in the collection of facts, and which are intended to elicit everything that can serve as a basis for the induction of social laws. To this end the elements and processes in society are carefully analyzed and classified. The form of statement is abstract, illustration or proof is scanty, and the work is highly schematic.

In the short but very meaty Book I, Professor Giddings explains how the inductive method may be applied to the problems of sociology. Book II deals with the "Elements and Structure of Society." Part I of this book is concerned with the "Social Population." Part II is devoted to the "Social Mind" and contains most of the new developments of theory. The chapters are: "Like Response to Stimulus," "Mental and Practical Resemblance," "The Consciousness of Kind," and "Concerted Volition."

Delving deeper than in his *Principles*, Professor Giddings finds that the universal and primordial social fact is "like response to stimulus." This has five stages of development, viz., momentary like response, habitual like response, mental and practical resemblance, the consciousness of kind, and concerted volition. He finds, furthermore, that all the activities of mind and body may be reduced to four, viz., appreciation, utilization, characterization, and socialization. In a word, one "sizes up" the world, adapts it to himself, adapts himself to it, and adapts himself to his fellows. This classification is not perfect, seeing that one utilizes his fellow-men as well as external objects. Nevertheless, it is the best that has been

offered, and again and again in the later analysis it proves to have real philosophic value.

The title "Mental and Practical Resemblance" is a misnomer, for the chapter is in fact a study of differences rather than resemblances. Four types of minds are distinguished—ideo-motor, ideo-emotional, dogmatic-emotional, and critical-intellectual. The first is the aggressive, forceful, instinctive man, who acts on perception and conjecture. The second is convivial, suggestible, imaginative, and guided by analogy. The third is domineering and austere, reasons deductively, and is swayed by ideas and dogmas. The fourth is creative, conscientious, objective, and critical. The types are worked out minutely, and later appear as a basis for the mental characteristics of different societies and of different stages in social development. This procedure is in line with the effort of recent thinkers to find in the original unlikeness of persons an adequate explanation of the wealth of variety in social behavior. Brooks Adams, Patten, and Ratzenhofer have made much of innate mental differences, but Professor Giddings's scheme of types strikes one as the most likely and workable that has yet been offered.

These types should have been distinguished, however, in the study of the "Social Population." That they are out of place in Part II is shown by the fact that in the succeeding chapter, "The Consciousness of Kind," no use whatever is made of them. This chapter shows the attraction of like for like to be the constitutive social bond; yet it does not appear that the profound resemblances of ideo-emotional people among themselves, or of dogmatic-emotional persons one to another, breaks the population into four great segregations, answering to the four great types of mind. On the contrary, it appears that the affinity-creating resemblances relate not so much to inborn disposition, character, and mental processes, as to acquired beliefs and practices. It is shown that what paves the way for sympathy is *assimilation*, i. e., the modification of ideas and activities by imitation.

In every population, therefore, there may be observed a general approach to certain persistent types of action, expression, and character. This is the socializing process in its most subtle and efficacious mode. It is this that ultimately blends the diverse elements of the most heterogeneous population into a homogeneous type. It creates a common speech, common modes of thought, and common standards of living. (P. 105.)

Again, we are left in the dark as to the origin and persistence of these types. Is a person born dogmatic-emotional, or does he become

so from his surroundings? Can he change his type of mind—run the gamut, for instance, from the low motor to the high intellectual type? If so, what influences bring about this change? Although our author does not say so, it would appear that type is mutable, and that the causes of individual ascent, and therefore of social progress, are in his view *intellectual*, rather than *moral, economic, or geographical*.

There is no question that the analyses centering in “the consciousness of kind” are a lasting contribution to our science. The experience of the writer has perhaps been typical. At its first appearance in Professor Giddings’s *Principles*, the notion smacked of metaphysics, and he looked upon it with suspicion. But social studies had left in his mind a litter of material which needed just the pigeon-hole provided by this idea. “The consciousness of kind” proved so handy and workable that now it is as much a part of his mental furniture as “marginal utility” or “the survival of the fittest.” No doubt this bit of capsuled wisdom will henceforth enter into the equipment of every social investigator.

The consciousness of resemblance brings about combination of thought and activity, which is treated under the very happily chosen designation “concerted volition.” This term does not abuse analogy, as does the term “the social will,” and, unlike the well-worn “co-operation,” it calls attention to process rather than to product.

A chapter on “Concerted Volition” is, moreover, a model of systematic presentation. Co-operation is discussed as to nature, causes, forms, extent. Its results, both in ideas and in activities, are set forth in the cultural, economic, moral, and political spheres. The modes of “concerted volition” are distinguished as instinctive, sympathetic, dogmatic, and deliberate like-mindedness, and for each of these the subjective and the objective factors are enumerated and the results are analyzed. The chapter throughout is a fine example of skilful analysis and pithy statement.

Part III is entitled “Social Organization,” and its fifty pages contain by far the best treatment of this subject to be found in sociological literature. The happy distinction between “component societies” and “constituent societies” is the key for which many hands have fumbled in vain. Since Professor Giddings found and applied it, the subject of organization has been opened up and filled with new light. It is to be wished, however, that he had taken account in this connection of the luminous studies of Simmel on superiority and subordination, and on the persistence of groups.

Part IV, "The Social Welfare," contains no important developments of Professor Giddings's system, but it is a rich store of tabloid wisdom.

No one can develop so sustained a scheme of thought without falling at times into inconsistency.

Thus kinship is defined (p. 49) so as to imply "community of blood." Yet a particular degree of kinship—"nationality"—is predicated of "all those who from birth have been of the same speech and political association;" while "potential nationality" is attributed to "those who dwell together in the same nation or state, and will presently speak the same language." Evidently "kinship" needs a more elastic definition.

Four parallels are cited (pp. 65-7) to justify the term "social mind." Three of these are analogies between society and mind, but one is an analogy between society and the brain.

"The consciousness of kind" is defined as both intellectual and emotional. Intellectually, it is an awareness of resemblance *and difference*; emotionally, it is the sympathy attending the perception of resemblance, *but not* the antipathy attending the perception of difference. Thus sometimes it figures as an emotionally neutral social consciousness (p. 66), and at other times as a late stage of integration (p. 65) and as a social bond (p. 108).

Booms and panics are classed with strikes (p. 128) as phenomena of "concerted volition," whereas, by the definition on p. 111, they should be regarded as merely cases of "like response to like stimulus."

Lack of agreement does not bespeak lack of respect, and the writer will therefore set forth his grounds for deeming certain of Professor Giddings's analyses insufficient. The following are not advanced as strictures, but rather as points of interregation.

It should be noted, however, that the scope of the book is not quite certain. Does it aim to tell American students what to look for in society here and now? Or does it aim at an adequate treatment of that portion of sociology dealing with the elements and structure of society? The many references to past forms and to other societies than ours seem to indicate the latter, and for this larger purpose the author may, therefore, be held responsible.

Parasitism.—If we do not take heed, we shall soon have on our hands a "social man" more phantasmal by far than the "economic man." In the society which Professor Giddings contemplates there appear to be no slaves, serfs, hereditary castes, privileged orders,

overtaxed classes, oppressed races, or "sullen subject peoples." Men co-operate spontaneously (p. 113) and divide without friction the fruits of their joint labors. The "unit of investigation" is the *socius* who is "a companion, a learner, a teacher, and co-worker" (p. 10). The "utilization" our author recognizes is always a utilization of things, never of fellow-men (pp. 58, 59). Wars of aggression are inspired by "a passion for homogeneity" (pp. 197, 132, 129) rather than a desire for slaves, land, tribute, or trade. The well-known fact that the social organization following conquest is coercive is attributed to want of like-mindedness between the two elements of the population (p. 227). Quite overlooked is the fact that the conquerors promptly establish a parasitic social system, which, as it automatically conveys to them the economic surplus of the conquered, can be maintained only by the force of arms.

The putting down of an insurrection is interpreted as "a collective defense of the social cohesion" (p. 132), whereas, in many cases, it has been the overpowering of a class struggling to throw off the economic yoke. Upholding sovereignty is by no means the same as defending the social cohesion.

Non-fraternizing, "socio-economic classes," founded on the segregation of like with like, are recognized (p. 242), but not antagonistic classes, occupying places of economic advantage or disadvantage in the social system, and struggling continually to advance their respective material interests.

Constrained association.—Society, we are told (p. 28), consists of individuals "resembling one another in mental organization, so far, at least, as to be able to work harmoniously together." But what of those composite groups in which co-operation is imposed by an intrusive conquering element? A sociology based on free association goes lame the moment we enter history, which shows on all hands the constrained association of unlike peoples for the benefit chiefly of the dominant stock. The incorporation of unwilling groups by force of arms is so common that no less a sociologist than Gumplowicz founds his system on this phenomenon. It is true that in the virgin territories of the new world have risen homogeneous industrial societies in which the presence of free land has disfavored militant and predatory activities. Here in America the state is, in fact, "the entire natural society, responding in like ways to the same stimuli and co-operating in the achievement of useful tasks of common interest" (p. 119). But this non-acquisitive state that hesitates to absorb even the unlike is modern.

If sociology is "a study of the constant elements in history" (p. 9), it may not confine its attention to latter-day nationalism. In genesis and evolution the state is an integration of the unlike and often of the unwilling. It begins usually in conquest, grows by aggression, leans heavily on physical force, obeys a minority, and influences the distribution of wealth to the advantage of its masters. Iron framework rather than supple tissue, it as often bends as responds to the will of the community. The state that can properly be termed "an entire natural society, viewed as co-operating" (p. 118), and that absorbs its neighbors in obedience to "a passion for homogeneity," is a late, as yet a rare, and, for aught we know, a transitory phenomenon. There are signs, indeed, that, far from being a mere organ of the common will of its subjects, the state of tomorrow is destined to serve as the agency by which the higher races will direct the lower races of the hot zone for the exploitation of tropical nature. In the writer's judgment, Professor Giddings has too much identified *state* with *society*, has too readily assumed that "consciousness of kind" is the key to the one as well as to the other. In his *Principles*, pp. 309-16, he has shown that he is not at all unaware of the grim recurrent facts of subjugation, lordship, and compulsory organization of labor; but the exigencies of his theory require him to base government on "consent."

Conflict.—Our author recognizes (p. 107) three causes of internal strife: (1) original differences not yet overcome by intercourse; (2) conflict between imitations, especially between custom-imitation and novelty-imitation (p. 106); (3) famine or catastrophe which brings to the surface the sheer instinct of self-preservation. Now, as to the first, original differences in the population are continually planed away, so that they retard, but do not interrupt, the process of assimilation. The third cause is rare and may be neglected. There remains, then, only interference among imitations to account for the electoral battles, parliamentary struggles, riots, revolts, and civil wars, which imperil the unity of the group and require long periods of social convalescence.

Is this adequate? It is true, heads have been broken over the Trinity, and throats cut for the Eucharist, but we can by no means admit the ideological explanation of the conflicts that rend social tissue almost as fast as it knits. Do not most of the history-making struggles arise from *material interests* rather than *ideas*? Original unlikenesses hardly outlast a few generations of intercourse and intermarriage. Mere differences of opinion rarely agitate the social deeps. On Professor Giddings's theory, then, the normal thing is a gradual fusing of

alien elements in a population and a deepening consciousness of kind, making the social union ever more voluntary and close. He does not recognize the falling apart into local types of a homogeneous people spreading into unlike environments. He does not prepare us for the genesis of ferocious hatreds and the recurrence of strife in the bosom of a population that has once practiced co-operation. He sees the harmonizing, but not the divisive forces; expatiates on the process that creates sympathies, but overlooks the process that creates antipathies. And yet, peasant wars, uprisings, rebellions, and secessions are not lightly to be brushed aside.

In the writer's view, the root of strife is practical, not speculative. Nowhere does the distribution of wealth stand quite so apart from public action or institutions as Professor Giddings's discussion (pp. 241, 242) would suggest. Besides the automatic factors, there are arbitrary factors that influence the apportionment of wealth; and from time to time struggle arises for the control of these arbitrary factors. Dynamic changes, such as new modes of production, improvements in transportation, the opening of new routes of commerce, redistributions of population, and local differences in rate of increase or accumulation, disturb old settlements in which men acquiesce, and create antagonism between sections or classes. As every "era of good feeling" terminates in the revival of party acrimony, so socialization is again and again checked by cleavage and strife. Men become more alive to their differences than to their resemblances, class feeling triumphs over the sense of solidarity, and the sect competes with society as a moral authority. Thus until a new balance is struck, or the cause of irritation removed. The cotton-gin, for example, started a sectional tension which ended in war and negro emancipation. A falling off in the production of gold begot a party bitterness which the recent increase in production has quite allayed. Even under our eyes, the antithesis of labor and capital engenders new morals, new philosophy, and new religion, and creates classes which forget they have anything in common. In a free society like ours, the forces that join men are probably more lasting than those that part them, but still the two processes exist, and neither should be neglected by the sociologist.

Social causation.—Our author has expressly reserved "the deeper problems of causation" (p. x), but in covering so much ground he has necessarily disclosed certain notions as to the causes of social happenings. These, in the writer's opinion, betray a one-sided view of men's groupings, co-operations, and aggressions. "Like-mindedness,"

"pleasure in companionship," "pleasure in co-operation," "passion for homogeneity" appear to be the motives that draw and bind men together. But these are luxuries, and if societies have been formed in the presence of the unremitting struggle for existence, it is likely that fear, hunger, and greed have sometimes been their architects. It is true that sympathy and the yearning of like toward like are always purely socializing forces; whereas fear, hunger, and greed unite men or divide them, according to circumstances. But this is no ground for ignoring the martial and economic factors in the creation and coalescence of groups, no justification for showing only one strand in the bond of union. Surely, practical motives have to be considered as well as social sentiments; identity or contrariety of interests as well as likeness or unlikeness.

In Professor Giddings's scheme, men associate for pleasure before they associate for profit. Again and again he makes enjoyment of like-mindedness *precede* co-operation. First an area of resemblance, then a perception of this resemblance, next sympathy and friendly companionship, and lastly (quite as an afterthought) working together for common purposes. By thus making co-operation for security, economy, or equity *follow upon* sympathetic association, he lends an air of plausibility to his favorite thesis that sociology is anterior and fundamental to politics, economics, and jurisprudence.

Do, then, the momentous groupings of men rest on the club basis of "congeniality"? Can we derive economic stages ("degrees of utilization," p. 76) from the number of degrees of kinship embraced within a society? Can we agree with our author (*Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1901) that social relations determine economy rather than economic relations determine society?

In the writer's view, the sphere of sociology is social phenomena, its chief task being to ascertain the recurring coexistences and sequences among these phenomena. There is need for this science because the life of society does not flow in distinct and parallel streams, but pours through a network of interlacing channels. There is not a political evolution through steps, *a, b, c, d*, etc., which the political scientist can account for; a juridical evolution through forms, *a', b', c', d'*, etc., which the jurist can interpret; an economic evolution through stages, *a", b", c", d"*, etc., which the economist can explain. Nor is there a linguistic, a religious, a philosophic, or an æsthetic series of states which can be understood without reference to other orders of social facts, by mere inspection of the individual or

the social mind. For these things hang together more than we had suspected. We are dealing with a whole, the parts of which determine one another, so that there are cross-relations between a and a' and a'' .

But the orders of social phenomena do not lie in one plane, for some are more likely to cause the other kinds of phenomena than to be caused by them. One of these basal orders is the conceptual and emotional series examined by linguistics, comparative religion, and the branch which Professor Giddings cultivates so well, and which we might term "the science of association." Another is the economic series, traced by the economic historian. It is vain to insist that one of these is independent of and prior to the other—although the two are relatively independent of the other orders of social facts. Vain, also, is it to interpret the succession of juristic, political, or cultural phenomena directly by individual psychology or even by social psychology.

Before von Ihering, the perfecting of a system of law was ascribed, not to economic or other changes, but to the clarifying of the moral consciousness of the folk. Before W. Robertson Smith, religious progress was credited to man's cumulative thinking and not correlated with family or tribal development. Taine taught the historian of the fine arts to have regard to *race*, *milieu*, and *moment*, as well as to the genius of the artist. Spencer and Gumplowicz have taught us to relate political evolution to military and industrial facts rather than to interpret it solely in terms of natural authority and obedience. Thus the special social sciences no longer rest immediately on psychology. To understand any prominent feature of social life one must review all the other features. This interdependence of social phenomena is the truth that the organic concept has sought to convey.

One who aspires to "a complete explanation of society in terms of simpler phenomena" (p. 7) ought to show how the group-building forces are weakened or reinforced by economic adjustments. Pastoral occupations, for instance, promote the solidarity of the nomad group. Tillage, with communal ownership of the soil, makes for stability as well as unity. Private ownership, on the other hand, loosens and individualizes. The money economy makes for the delinquency of groups, but it gives birth to trade which assimilates men and paves the way for larger syntheses. Handicraft industry is integrating, as witnesses the mediæval "town;" but capitalism has a certain disaggregating influence, seeing it engenders both economic and socio-economic classes. All those improvements which lead from a local

through a national to a world economy—steam locomotion, for instance, and electric communication—give a mighty impulse to synthesis. Of utmost importance are the relations of population to land. The American homestead makes for free association, but the Spanish-American *encomienda* starts society with economic inequality and hence makes for a coercive social organization. An economy in a static condition stiffens authority, whether of tradition or of government. In a dynamic condition, on the other hand, it promotes a free and rational concert of action. Invention and unoccupied land, the two chief causes of a dynamic condition, are therefore the economic foundations of democracy. And democracy, far from being an end-form of social development, may yet suffer in our world the fate it suffered in that classic world which was so much more “modern” than the centuries that lie between it and us.

Be all this as it may, it is certain that the volume before us yields a large amount of original matter and sound wisdom with a minimum of positive error. Indeed, there are few men who can traverse trackless ground with so rare a misstep as Professor Giddings. The injunction to regard no statement in the book as final, but as “a challenge to find out whether it is true or false” (p. 32), bespeaks the true scientific spirit. May this praiseworthy endeavor to stimulate systematic social observation and win an inductive basis for our science meet with success!

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De la division du travail social. Par ÉMILE DURKHEIM, professeur de sociologie à l'Université de Bordeaux. Deuxième édition, augmentée d'une préface sur les groupements professionnels. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1902. Pp. xlv + 416.

Psychologie économique. Par G. TARDE, de l'Institut, professeur au Collège de France. Tome premier, pp. 383; tome second, pp. 449. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1902.

WHETHER coincidence, or “imitation,” or “opposition,” or “constraint,” it is noteworthy that these eminent French sociologists, so unlike in their theories, are simultaneously publishing works which betray fundamental similarities. We must defer notice of M. Tarde's volumes beyond the general statement that the main outline of the treatment is drawn from his well-known points of departure. He attempts to organize economic phenomena under the three categories: